Category Archives: Web Security

Preventing Clickjacking Using Content Security Policy

I recently came across an issue with a legacy system which allowed its login page to be framed by any site. This is a problem because that login page needs to be framed by other pages that reside on other subdomains of the same site.

Framing login pages is a bad practice in general. In most cases I would opt to just rewrite a site’s code and remove the need to frame login pages. However in this specific case rewriting the code for this system would have taken an extended amount of time. Further more the whole system is scheduled to be replaced within the next year. With these factors in mind, I went searching for a quick way to block unauthorized framing of the system’s login pages.

With the need to allow framing from multiple subdomains, the old best practice of using the X-Frame option of SAMEORIGIN won’t work. I did a little research and found the ALLOW-FROM option on Mozilla’s Developer Network. Some browsers such as FireFox and Internet Explorer will support the ALLOW-FROM option. This allows content to be shown from a given URL, including the use of wildcards. However in the MDN documentation it states that the ALLOW-FROM option not supported in Chrome or Safari.

After doing a bit of searching, I found comments on multiple bug trackers (1, 2, 3) that suggests Chrome and other WebKit browsers will never support this feature. Instead they support the Content Security Policy frame-ancestors options.

If you are unfamiliar with Content Security Policy see this link. The tl;dr is that Content Security Policy allows sites to restrict where content such as JavaScript, images, fonts, etc are loaded from and how they can be used within the page. In this post we will look specifically at the frame-ancestors option.

Implementing the frame-ancestors option is very simple and consists of adding a single header. The system I mentioned at the beginning of this post runs on Apache. So implementing this was as simple as adding the line below to the .htaccess file in the login page’s directory.

Header set Content-Security-Policy "frame-ancestors https://*.[appdomain].com;"

That single line will only allow subdomains of the app’s domain to frame the login page. All other pages will display a Content Security Policy violation message or a blank page depending on the browser. This assumes that the page is viewed with a browser that supports the frame-ancestors Content Security Policy option.

Before implementing this on the legacy system mentioned; I created a few test pages to see how this worked. I created a test login page at If you visit this page you will notice that there is a message regarding an externally loaded jQuery library. I included this as some Content Security Policies will block external JavaScript libraries and I wanted to make sure any changes I made still allowed these libraries to be loaded.

I also created a .htaccess file with a single entry to block framing on any site other then That line is:

Header set Content-Security-Policy "frame-ancestors;"

Next I created a page that frames that login page and includes an example of a div overlay that could be used to grab a users credentials. I then hosted that file on two different domains, one on the same subdomain here: and on the parent domain here:

If you visit the two links, you will notice that the first link hosted on the same subdomain will allow framing. You can also click the “Show login overlay” checkbox to see new text fields and login button appear over the framed page. These overlaid controls allow user entered credentials to be intercepted and then passed on to the original system. For the second link, the framed login page will not load and may even show an error message.

Last thoughts:

If you examine the code on the login page you will notice a meta tag attempting to implement the same policy supplied by the Apache headers. This was an attempt to implement the same policy without out the need to send an extra header. However, it appears that while many Content Security Polices can be implemented by this meta tag, frame-ancestors cannot be. I could not find a clear reason as to why, other than that it’s not in the spec.

Detecting Abuse on WordPress Sites

This blog runs on WordPress. It is pretty obvious looking at my basic layout and theme, if not the “Proudly powered by WordPress” stamp at the bottom of this page. WordPress is great, it is easy to setup, easy to manage, write posts for and add plugins. This ease of use attracts a lot of users that tend not to know much of how websites work or web security in general.

Due to this lack of knowledge by some of its users, many WordPress instances are vulnerable to attacks. These attacks may target poorly written plugins, weak passwords, outdated versions of WordPress core or its plugins. Most vulnerabilities for the these targets are widely known by attackers and those attackers write scripts to look for vulnerabilities. Attackers can build up lists of WordPress sites using carefully crafted search engine queries. Site lists combined with automated scrips looking for known vulnerabilities means that attackers can search a large number of sites in a relatively short amount of time.

As a result most WordPress blogs are tested by attackers for vulnerabilities at some point. These tests are usually not very discrete and can be detected in the server logs. I am a curious individual so I look at my logs quite a bit and I see a number of these vulnerability tests. When I first noticed these log entries, I ignored them. When I kept seeing them in the logs I noticed that most of these attacks tests conformed to patterns. This made me wonder if I could detect these attack tests automatically. It turns out for many of them I can.

I accomplished this automation primarily by creating custom 404 and 400 error documents and directing my .htaccess file to use them. In these files I capture the remote IP, request URL and the user agent. In the 404 error handler I examine the request URL for strings that I’ve observed over and over again in my Apache logs; URL requests for files that do not exist in my WordPress instance. These requests are usually for specific files used by plugins that I do not have installed. When I find these request I log the remote IP, time and a short description.

I also examine the user agent strings looking for strings generated by common code libraries like python, pearl, wget, curl and others. These are from scrips written to look for specific files, may of which are testing for vulnerabilities. If I see one of these user agent strings on a non-existent file, I log it. I also added this code to the head of my wp-login.php file, denying access for script user agents and logging any attempts to login. This catches a fair number of scripts trying to bruit force my WordPress login.

Finally in the 400 error document, I again look for specific strings that I’ve found in my logs, logging any matches. All this code results in a list of IPs with descriptions and timestamps. As of writing this post I have not done much with the resulting list so far, but I figured it might be of use to other site admins out there. So for anyone interested in my list of detected malicious IPs it can be viewed at:

The link above provides a CSV file of malicious IPs detected in the last 24 hours. It is also possible to specify the time frame and format. Right now the script supports both csv and json formats and can provide results for a time frame of the last 1 to 336 hours (2 weeks).

Example JSON format for malicious IPs in the last 36 hours:

Example CSV format for malicious IPs in the last 12 hours:

All timestamps are in USA Central time. I plan on updating malicious IP detection and this output script in the future, but plan on using versioning via the v* directory. Feel free to use this list in aggregated block lists for private or commercial use.